Market Formation in China from 1978 by Tang, Rongsheng
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Market Formation in China from 1978
Tang, Rongsheng
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
24 January 2021
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/105510/
MPRA Paper No. 105510, posted 26 Jan 2021 14:30 UTC
Market Formation in China from 1978
Rongsheng Tang∗
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
January 2021
Abstract
This paper studies the formation of market economy in China from 1978
to 1992, a period in which market economy was introduced and developed
alongside planned government procurements for agricultural goods. Under
the “dual track system” (DTS), rural farmers were obligated to fulfill govern-
ment procurements before selling to the market, whereas urban consumers
enjoyed de facto subsidies to agricultural products. Using a neoclassical gen-
eral equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and workers and input-
output linkage, this paper exploits historical data and analyzes allocation,
prices, and the formation of markets in China during this DTS period. Theo-
retically, while DTS will distort the resources allocation between rural and ur-
ban (misallocation effect), it selects workers and farmers in the rural (selection
effect). What is more, comparing to the economy under Soviet-style big bang
reform, DTS activates industrialization by providing intermediate goods with
lower-than-market price (activation effect). Quantitatively, directly switching
to market economy in 1978 would decrease total output by 4.5% as the activa-
tion effect dominates. On the intensive margin, reform on DTS ( procurement
price was getting closer to market price ) had contributed to total output by
4.4% from 1978 to 1992.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the formation of market economy in China from 1978 to 1992,
a period in which market economy was introduced and developed alongside
planned government procurements for agricultural goods. Unlike big bang re-
form in Soviet Union, DTS built a bridge between the planned and market sys-
tems in China. How and how much did it activate Chinese economy at very be-
ginning? How much has the price distortion affected different sectors? Using
a neoclassical general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and workers
and input-output linkage, we exploit historical data and analyze allocation, prices,
and the formation of markets in China during this DTS period. As it is believed
that the agricultural reform in the 1980s mainly contributed to China’s growth,
understanding DTS will help understand the rise of the Chinese economy as well
as the effect of opening the internal market and gradual reform.
Under DTS, farmers were obligated to sell agricultural products to the govern-
ment at a given price before selling the remaining products in the market. Urban
workers and enterprises enjoyed quota benefits that allowed them to buy agri-
cultural products at a lower price from the government.1 Before DTS, there was
no market, these products could only be sold to the government. As agricultural
productivity was low, a minuscule quantity of agricultural products was left over
after procurement. Hence the whole economy was under the plan: firms pro-
duced a certain quantity of products, and there was not much agricultural prod-
uct surplus for the market. However, as agricultural productivity increased, the
economy deviated from the plan. There was an increasing amount of agricultural
products, as well as a labor surplus in rural areas, and firms also expanded. This
unplanned economic situation forced the government to relax market regulations,
and to make a smooth transition, the government introduced DTS (one good with
two prices) to partially open the market. Furthermore, to have sustainable growth
and be afraid of market fluctuation, in the early stage of development, the gov-
ernment implemented the policy to “help some people get rich first and then help the
others”. In the context of DTS, government subsidized urban firms and consumers
via quota benefit and taxed the rural people through the procurement. By the end
of 1992, this policy was totally abolished, and all agricultural products were free
to be traded in.
1Although, in the real economy, the selling price from the government was usually higher than
the purchasing price to cover transportation and other costs, we ignore these costs in the model
for simplicity.
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The internal market openness was an important policy, and the market struc-
ture changed dramatically from the late 1970s. Historical data shows that the
price-adjusted market trade share of agricultural products increased from 5% in
1975 to 45% in 1992. It is believed that the change was mainly due to the relaxation
of the procurement requirement. In addition, the procurement price for compos-
ite agricultural products has been increasing since 1978. In particular, the ratio of
market price to procurement price was 1.8 in 1978, dropped to 1.1 in 1989, and in
1992 it was almost 1.2
We will focus on the impact of this procurement policy. First, it distorts the
allocation of agricultural goods as urban firms enjoy the quota benefit, which in
turn will affect the firm entries. Second, procurement placed burden on rural peo-
ple, which will select them in farming and manufacturing production, shaping
the labor allocations. In order to consider them all, we build a neoclassical gen-
eral equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and workers and input-output
linkage.
In the model, there are two separate labor markets: rural and urban. Rural has
farmland and enterprises (Township and Village Enterprises, TVEs), while urban
only has enterprises. There are two goods in the economy: agricultural goods and
manufacturing goods. Agricultural goods can only be produced on farmland; and
manufacturing goods can be produced in enterprises in both rural and urban. In
addition, both goods can be used as consumption goods and intermediate goods.
There is no migration between rural and urban,3 but rural people could choose
to be a farmer or a worker in rural enterprises. While farmers can plant on the
land for free, workers don’t have this right. However, farmers have an obligation
regarding procurement, but workers can waive it.
In addition, there are two types of ability: farming and manufacturing, which
can be used only in agricultural goods and manufacturing goods production re-
spectively. Enterprises are different in terms of productivity and the manufactur-
ing of agricultural products. While urban enterprises enjoy the quota benefit with
respect to purchasing a certain amount of agricultural products below the market
price, rural enterprises can only purchase the products at the market price.
Furthermore, although both enterprises and workers take the procurement
and quota as given, essentially DTS was implemented to accelerate urban econ-
omy first and then to help rural people get rich. More generally, the quantity on
2More details on DTS are documented in Section 2.
3We ignore the migration because, in the data, the migration rate was only 0.19% in both 1978
and 1992. There is more discussion in Section 7.
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procurement and quota reflect the magnitude the government values the urban
and rural. In the model, the procurement and quota quantity are determined by
the government to maximize the total weighted social welfare. As the weight on
urban varies across years, the procurement level will change. Hence our analysis
could only focus on the procurement directly instead of the weighted on rural or
urban.
Theoretically, there are three main mechanisms on DTS: activation effect, se-
lection effect, misallocation effect. Activation effect captures the effect that, com-
paring with economy under Soviet-style big bang reform, as urban enterprises
enjoy the quota benefit, the gross manufacturing output could be larger, which in
turn will increase the agricultural goods output as the intermediate goods sup-
ply increases. Selection effect represents that procurement requirement will play
a role as screening machine–only rural people with relative high farming ability
will stay as farmers. Misallocation effect means that some low productive firms in
urban can survive due to quota benefit, whereas firms with higher productivity in
rural may not survive. While the first one is on the extensive margin, the latter two
are effects on the intensive margin. When the procurement price decreases, people
in rural areas are more likely to work in rural enterprises, then the total output of
agricultural products decreases which also shrinks its supply as intermediate in-
put. However, since the labor force in the rural enterprise gets less, the net impact
on rural enterprise output is ambiguous. In addition, as the intermediate input
price for urban enterprise becomes lower, enterprises with low productivity enter
the market and the total output increases, which increases agricultural goods pro-
duction. The results are similar when the procurement quantity decreases, except
that urban output will decrease because of less quota benefit. Therefore, in the
intensive margin effect, the impact of DTS is ambiguous.
For the quantitative analysis, we calibrate the model to the Chinese econ-
omy each year from 1978 to 1992 and conduct several counterfactual experiments.
Firstly, we take 1978 as benchmark and compare with the market economy, and
we also study the intensive margin effect as the the weight on urban changes. Sec-
ondly, we take each year of 1979-1992 as benchmark and replace parameters with
1978’s value. Thirdly, we decompose the impact of different factors on economic
growth and welfare. Finally, we study the economy with second-hand market and
frictionless economy as two extensions.
The quantitative results show that directly switching to market economy in
1978 would decrease total output by 4.5% but increase rural welfare by 43.9% in
equivalent consumption. That is to say, DTS has activated economy with sacrific-
ing rural’s welfare. On the other hand, from 1978 to 1992, the procurement price is
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getting closer to market price, which had contributed positively to total output by
4.4% and rural welfare by 14.1%, and it contributed negatively to agricultural out-
put by 18.1% and total welfare by 11.3%. The quantitative results also confirmed
that productivity improvement contributed mostly to Chinese economic growth.
Furthermore, in the economy with second-hand market, there is not much change
in output of different sectors, but the welfare changed significantly. For example,
comparing to benchmark in 1978, the total output would decrease by 6%, the rural
welfare would decrease by 36%. However, in frictionless economy, the impact is
much larger. The total output in 1978 would be tripled comparing to benchmark,
and the rural welfare would increase by more than 23 times.
Before delving into the details of the paper, we highlight one of contributions.
In a recent debate between gradual and sudden transition, we take the stand that
the gradual reform could activate the economy, pushing it out of low-equilibrium
trap. The main mechanism is that industrialization requires agricultural goods
as intermediate inputs, then, given the agricultural productivity is low, there is a
shortage in the supply. While when there is quota benefit, manufacturing goods
output will be higher which in turn will increase agricultural goods production
as it also use manufacturing goods as intermediate inputs. We call this virtuous
circle as “activation effect” or “extensive margin effect” in contrary to detrimental
effect the distortion usually cause, while we refer the latter as “intensive margin
effect”, including “misallocation effect” and “selection effect” as discussed above.
This study provides a framework to understand market formation, particu-
larly when the market is partially open. The current Chinese economy is still
under transition to internal market openness. This dual track economy exists in
different scenarios. For example, there are different interest rates for State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) and Private Owned Enterprises (POEs). While SOEs, taking
advantage of low interest rate, can survive with lower productivity, POEs can bor-
row from bank or SOEs, which is similar to the second-hand market discussed in
the extension. The current model is easy to extend to incorporate these scenarios
and have policy implications.
Related literature
We emphasize both the extensive and intensive margin effects of DTS in this pa-
per. The analysis on extensive margin relates to studies on the economic transition
from planned economy to market economy, and the analysis on intensive margin
effect relates to the studies on misallocation and selection in agricultural produc-
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tivity. We summarize them as follows.
On one hand, research on the Chinese economic transition from a planned to
a market economy usually covers property rights and firm ownership ( Jin and
Qian (1998), Li (1997), Naughton (1994), Qian and Xu (1993)). Among them,
Jin and Qian (1998) study the role of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs),
and Li (1997) studies the impact of economic reform on state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). Different from these studies, our paper studies the procurement policy
on goods markets. While Byrd (1991) analyzes the static and dynamic impacts
of DTS on Chinese industry, Sicular (1988) builds a theoretical model to analyze
DTS in China’s agricultural sector. Our paper closely relate to Sicular (1988) as we
both study the procurement on agricultural goods. While she focuses on interac-
tion of procurement and market price, we mainly study the impact on aggregate
outcome and allocative efficiency.
Some studies also analyze the effect of DTS on efficiency; however, there is no
common agreement. While Lau et al. (2000) show that under some standard con-
ditions, the dual track approach to market liberalization was a Pareto improve-
ment, Young (2000) argues that the incremental reform would lead to the frag-
mentation of the domestic market and the distortion of regional production when
considering rent-seeking incumbents. Similar to McMillan et al. (1989) who pro-
pose that the incentive will change under the market price, we also take the stand
on former one but emphasize that DTS will activate the economy through the vir-
tuous circle of input-output linkage.
In addition, a section of the literature compares Chinese economy with East-
ern European economies ( McMillan and Naughton (1992), Murphy et al. (1992),
Sachs and Woo (1994), Li (1999), Roland and Verdier (2003)). Murphy et al. (1992)
present a theory of partial economic reform and explain the reasons for the fail-
ure of reforms in Russia in contrast to the successful Chinese reforms. Li (1999)
also compares the Soviet-style big bang reform and the Chinese dual track reform
and concludes that a transition policy is necessary to have a smooth transition.
Guriev (2019) discusses several alternative explanations on the question of why
Soviet Union did not follow China to reform the economy. Our study also relates
to Cheremukhin et al. (2017) who identify and study the impact of frictions on
structural transformation of Russia in 1885-1913 and 1928-1940 from an agrarian
to an industrial economy.
On the other hand, our intensive margin analysis is related to research on mis-
allocation and selection in agricultural productivity. The literature on misallo-
cation covers the measurement, causes, and consequences (Hsieh and Klenow
(2009), Buera et al. (2011),Song et al. (2011), Midrigan and Xu (2014), Restuccia
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and Rogerson (2017) among others). We contribute to the literature by interpret-
ing DTS as a specific cause of misallocation, which distorts the market price of
agricultural goods. As we focus on DTS of agricultural goods, it also relates to
literature on agricultural productivity (Restuccia et al. (2008), Adamopoulos and
Restuccia (2014), Chen (2017)). Adamopoulos et al. (2017) emphasizes the role of
selection across sectors, considering the constraint on productive farmers. While
they claim that productive farmers choose an occupation in a nonagricultural sec-
tor, Lagakos and Waugh (2013) predict the opposite. Our model is in line with the
former because their model is calibrated with Chinese data.
As the agricultural and manufacturing goods production are connected through
input-output linkage, our study also relates to Jones (2011) and Liu (2019) among
others. Liu (2019) argues that there may be an economic rationale behind certain
industrial policies favoring selected sectors, and these policies might have gener-
ated positive network effects in China. In our study, we only focus on agricultural
and manufacturing sector but specify the DTS as the mechanism of selection and
misallocation.
Organization of the paper This paper is organized as follows: section 2 docu-
ments the main facts, section 3 describes a quantitative model, section 4 illustrates
the main mechanisms, section 5 calibrates the model, section 6 presents the quan-
titative results, section 7 discuss issues on migration and capital, and section 8
concludes.
2 Facts
This section describes the main statistic characteristics of DTS. The data is mainly
collected from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. The left panel
of Figure C.1 presents the ratio between procurement price and market price for
composite materials from agricultural products. As shown in the figure, this ratio
was increasing from the middle of the 1970s. This means that the procurement
price was getting closer to the market price. The fact that all the values were less
than 1 implies that the procurement price was lower than the market price.
NBS also provides information on the trade value in the market and under
procurement. Market openness is calculated as the ratio of the value of agricul-
tural products traded in the market to the aggregate value of that from both the
market and procurement. In addition, a price-adjusted ratio value is also calcu-
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lated by dividing price ratio on trade value from procurement.4 Figure C.1 shows
the trends of market share under both cases from 1953 to 1992. Starting from the
middle 1970s, the market trade share increased from around 10% to 45%, which
confirms that the agricultural products market in China became more open.
In addition, Figure C.2 shows the quantity and the price of procurement obli-
gation for grain and cotton between 1950 and 1992, and the procurement quantity
is under the category of government purchasing.5 The left panel of this figure
shows the ratio of procurement quantity to the total output of grain and cotton.
Cotton had a higher procurement ratio than did grain; while the ratio for grain
was stable at 20%, the ratio for cotton decreased beginning in the late 1960s. There
is no data after 1992 as DTS was abolished. The right panel of Figure C.2 presents
the ratio of procurement price to the market price for rice and wheat, and the data
is from Sicular (1995). It shows that although there is a large volatility, this ratio is
general higher in 1992 than 1980.
One may think that the reduced difference between procurement price and
market price may be due to the composition effect. As the economy grows, grain
accounts for a small portion of the agricultural output, whereas cash crops such
as cotton are more important. Furthermore, if the price between the two tracks
is smaller for cash crops than it is for grains, then even if the price difference of
individual crops does not change, the composition effect implies that the aggre-
gated price difference is smaller. To address this issue, we compare the output
data on grains and cash crops as shown in left panel of Figure C.3. It shows that
although, starting from 1978, the ratio of grain to the total of agricultural products
decreased, by 1992, this ratio was still higher than 75%. Therefore, the potential
composition effect cannot be substantial, and the fact that, in 1992, the procure-
ment price was close to the market price is probably mainly due to the change of
policy on procurement.6
In addition, while agricultural productivity increased rapidly from 1978, the
labor market in China was segmented through the “Hukou” system. To absorb
the surplus rural labor force, more township and village enterprises (TVEs) were
established, particularly after 1984. Data on TVEs were collected from CSY or
from the China TVEs Yearbook; however, there is some inconsistency between




, as price ratio is always
less than 1, this adjusted share is smaller than the unadjusted share.
5This category is similar to that used in Sicular (1995).
6Due to lack of procurement price information on this two types of crops, we couldn’t have
more precise calculation.
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these two sources. The value in the TVEs Yearbook is generally higher than that
in CSY. In our study, we use the data from CSY because it is more promising and
popular in the literature. The data have four components in the rural enterprises
based on ownership: township, villages, private, and mixed. Because the data
on TVEs includes only the township enterprises before 1984, two versions of the
statistic characteristics are calculated. In the first version (v1), only township en-
terprise data is used, and in the second version (v2), all the four components are
included. As shown in Figure C.4, both the number of TVEs and its employment
share in rural areas had increased. In 1984, there was a large increase in the num-
ber of private TVEs, the output value share of which increased from 15% to 30%.
Therefore, the jump in 1984 was mainly due to the addition of private TVEs in the
data.
The right panel of Figure C.3 presents the log value of the number of urban
enterprises from NBS. The number of urban enterprises increased from the early
1970s. In what is similar to the case of TVEs, it also includes four components:
SOEs and private, mixed, and others, including foreign enterprises. As only SOE
data are available for the period before 1984, two versions are presented. The first
version includes only SOEs, and the second version includes all of them; the jump
in the figure is due to the inclusion of private enterprises after 1984.
In sum, the data shows that between 1978 and 1992, the market share of agri-
cultural products increased a great deal; the ratio of procurement price to market
price increased; the mass of TVEs and employment share in TVEs increased; and
the mass of urban enterprises increased.
3 A model on DTS
3.1 Environment
In the model, there are two separate labor markets: rural and urban. Rural has
farmland and enterprises, but urban only has enterprises. There are two goods in
the economy: agricultural and manufacturing. While agricultural goods can only
be produced on farmland, manufacturing goods can be produced in enterprises
in both rural and urban. In addition, both of them can be used for consumption
and intermediate input. Furthermore, there is no migration between rural and ur-
ban, but rural people could choose to be a farmer or a worker in rural enterprises.
While farmers can plant on the land for free, workers don’t have this right. How-
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ever, farmers have an obligation regarding procurement, but workers can waive it.
On the other hand, urban people can only work in urban enterprises. Enterprises
are heterogeneous in productivity z, workers are heterogeneous in two-dimension
ability h = (hF, hE) where hF is the ability of farming to yield agricultural product
and hE is the ability to produce manufacturing goods.
The procurement and quota are modeled as follows. On the procurement side,
for each unit of land, workers on farmland have an obligation to sell at least Q̄
units of agricultural products at price P̄a to the government, and after fulfilling
this obligation, they are free to trade in the market. On the quota side, urban en-
terprises are eligible to buy agricultural products at price P̄a from the government;
however, the total amount is limited by q̄. There is no second-hand market, that
is, firms are not allowed to sell agricultural goods brought from government as
quota benefit in the market.
Furthermore, although both enterprises and workers take the procurement
and quota as given, essentially DTS was implemented to accelerate urban econ-
omy first and then to help rural people get rich. More generally, the quantity on
procurement and quota reflect the magnitude the government values the urban
and rural. In the model, the procurement and quota quantity are determined by
the government to maximize the total weighted social welfare. As the weight on
urban varies across years, the procurement level will change. Hence our analysis
could only focus on the procurement directly instead of the weighted on rural or
urban.
3.2 Agricultural goods production
Agricultural goods are produced on rural farmland, and land is equally distributed
among farmers. Denote Z̄ the total amount of farmland and LRF the total number
of farmers, then the land size for each farmer is ZRF =
Z̄
LRF
.7 Given the intermedi-






where αa is the share of intermediate goods, 1 − αa is the share of factor inputs,
η is the land share of factor inputs. Given the ability distribution G(h) and the
7In the real economy, land is equally distributed across households weighted by member num-
ber; however, for split households or moved workers, the policy is not clear at the national level.
Some may still have land, while others may not. To avoid this confusion, we assume that the land
is distributed only among people who are still working on farmland.
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total labor force LR in rural area, aggregate production of agricultural goods is the





Given the procurement requirement Q̄ for each piece of land, farmers choose in-
termediate input xa and quantity selling to government Qa to maximize the net






1−η)1−αa xαaa − Pmxa − (Pa − P̄a)Qa. (2)
3.3 Manufacturing goods production
Manufacturing goods could be produced in rural (R) and urban (U) areas. In
sector j = R, U, denote Aj is the location specific productivity, Hj is the human








1−γj , j = R, U
where 1 − γj is the span of control and αj, 1 − αj denote the share of agricultural
goods and human capital respectively. The assumption that both agricultural
goods and manufacturing goods are used as intermediate goods follows Jones
(2011) but differs from Restuccia et al. (2008) where only manufacturing goods are
used as intermediate goods. This is based on the fact that, in the context of China,
the Input-Output table shows the share of agricultural goods used in producing
nonagricultural goods is significant.8
Following Brandt et al. (2018), we assume productivity z follows Pareto distri-
bution F(z), and there are potential mass Mj enterprises. The total output is the




yj(z)dF(z), j = R, U. (3)
As there is no labor mobility across rural and urban areas, the wage rate will be
8Data of Input-Output table from 1981 to 1992 shows that while the share of non-agricultural
goods used in producing agricultural goods is 0.157, the share of agricultural goods used in pro-
ducing nonagricultural goods is 0.066. It is a bit lower because the price of agricultural goods is
generally much lower; however, it is persistent and high in some industries (e.g., the food industry,
the textile industry, etc.). More details are documented in Table C.1 and Table C.2.
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different, denoted by wR and wU. The profit for firm z in rural is
πR(z) = max
HR,xR
PmyR(z)− wRHR − PaxR. (4)









PmyU(z)− wU HU − P̄axU if xU ≤ q̄
max
HU ,xU
PmyU(z)− wU HU − PaxU + (Pa − P̄a)q̄ if xU > q̄.
(5)
In the case of xU > q̄, the profit function can be written as






As 0 < Pa−P̄aPa
q̄
xU
< 1, the quota benefit and the procurement price imply a lower-
than-market input price in general, and Pa−P̄aPa
q̄
xU
is an implicit distortion on inter-
mediate goods allocation due to quota benefit. Hence, in this model, the distor-
tion is caused by quota benefit. As the amount of input xU increases, the ex-post
price (1 − Pa−P̄aPa
q̄
xU
)Pa gets closer to the market price Pa; and the price distortion
decreases as xU increases.
3.4 Workers
A worker’s utility depends on consumption of agricultural goods (a) and manu-
facturing goods (m)
u(a, m) = θlog(a − ā) + (1 − θ)log(m),
subject to budget constraint Paa + Pmm ≤ I, where θ is the weight on agricultural
goods; ā is the subsistence level of agricultural goods; Pa, Pm are the market prices
of agricultural and manufacturing goods, respectively, and I is worker’s income.




) + (1 − θ)log(
1 − θ
Pm
)] + log(I − Pa ā).
Rural workers could choose working in rural enterprises (RE) or on the farm-
land (RF). The income in RE is from the wage and share of profit from rural
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enterprises, that is,




where ΠR = MR
∫
DR
πR(z)dF(z) is the total profit from rural enterprises, and
people in rural share the profit equally. On the other hand, the net income for
farmer with ability h is given by















is the price distortion faced by farmers which is caused by procurement. In partic-
ular, as Qa < ya(h) and P̄a < Pa, this distortion is increasing in procurement level
Qa.
Workers in urban areas will only work in urban enterprises UE whose income




πU(z)dF(z), which is equally distributed among the urban people,





In the above setting, both enterprises and workers take the procurement (Q̄) and
quota (q̄) as given. Essentially DTS was implemented to accelerate urban econ-
omy first and then to help rural people. More generally, the quantity on procure-
ment and quota reflect the magnitude the government values the urban and rural.
Hence, in the model, the procurement and quota quantity are determined by the
government to maximize the total weighted social welfare.
As a direct effect, high procurement will hurt farmers’ welfare but will make
urban people better off. However, as manufacturing goods output increases, the
intermediate goods in agricultural production will be cheaper, which will improve
farmer’s welfare. The total welfare in urban is the aggregate of all the urban work-
ers, LU
∫
U V(IU(h))dG(h), and the welfare in rural is sum of enterprises work-




RF V(IRF(h))dG(h)]. Denote χU the
weight on welfare for urban household, the government’s problem is to set the
















min{xU(z), q̄}dF(z) = Q̄Z̄ (9)
where the budget constraint says the government will sell all the agricultural
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goods brought from farmers to urban firms as the quota benefit. Therefore, in
this model, procurement and quota are endogenously determined, as the weight
on urban varies across year, the procurement level will change, and the impact on
economy will be also different.
3.6 Equilibrium
In order to characterize the equilibrium, we define the following aggregate vari-









xj(z)dF(z), j = R, U (11)






























Hj(z)dF(z), j = R, U (16)
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Equilibrium The equilibrium is characterized by agricultural goods selling to
government {Qa} and intermediate goods {xa(h)}, labor allocation in rural {LRF, LRE},
enterprises factor input {Hj(z), xj(z)}, j = R, U , and procurement and quota level
{Q̄, q̄}, wage rate {wR, wU}, and goods prices {Pa, Pm} such that
1. {Qa, xa(h)} maximizes rural worker income as in (2).
2. {LRF, LRE} is the result of the occupation choice for rural people, as in equa-
tion (7) and (6).
3. {Hj(z), xj(z)}, j = R, U maximizes enterprise profit in equation (4) and (5).
4. {Q̄, q̄} solves government’s problem to maximize total welfare as in equa-
tion (8) and (9).
5. wR, wU, Pa, Pm clear labor markets and goods markets.
(a) Rural labor market clear, HDR = H
S
R, as in equation (16) and (17).
(b) Urban labor market clear, HDU = H
S
U as in equation (16) and (18).
(c) Agricultural goods market clear, Ya = xR + xU + aR + aU as in equation
(1), (11), (12), and(13).
(d) Manufacturing goods market clear, YR + YU = xa + mR + mU as in
equation (3), (10), (14), and (15).
4 Theoretical results
In this section, we illustrate three main mechanisms of DTS: activation effect, se-
lection effect, misallocation effect. Activation effect captures the idea that as ur-
ban enterprises enjoy the quota benefit, the gross manufacturing output could be
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larger, which in turn will increase the agricultural goods output as the intermedi-
ate goods supply increases. Selection effect represents that procurement require-
ment will play a role as screening machine–only rural people with relative high
farming ability will stay as farmers. Misallocation effect means that some low
productive firms in urban can survive due to quota benefit, whereas firms with
higher productivity in rural may not survive. To illustrate these mechanisms, we
simplify the benchmark model and only focus on one channel in each subsection
in below.
4.1 Activation effect
To illustrate the activation effect, we simplify the model in the following way. Both
worker’s ability and firm’s productivity are homogeneous, agricultural goods are
produced in rural, enterprises are located only in urban, and there is no migration.
Procurement is determined by the government to maximize the total welfare.
We compare the general equilibrium results of market economy with that in




and normalize Pm = 1, market clear condition under DTS requires
[1 − θ(1 − αa)]Aa[αaPa Aa]
αa
1−αa Z̄ + θ(1 − κP)Q̄Z̄ − [(1 − θ)ā]LRF









such that ( κPPaαa AU )
1
αU−1 LU ≤ Q̄Z̄. On the other hand, the equilibrium condition in
market economy implies
[1 − θ(1 − αa)]Aa[αaPa Aa]
αa
1−αa Z̄ − [(1 − θ)ā]LRF









Figure 1 compares the equilibrium price and outputs under DTS (PDa ) and mar-
ket economy (PMa ), which is also summarized in Proposition 1. It shows that if κP
and Aa are small enough, under DTS the outputs in both agricultural and manu-
facturing sector are higher. That is to say, DTS activates the economy when agri-
cultural productivity is low enough. Note we take κp as exogenous, and Pa is
general equilibrium price, by this setting, procurement price is also general equi-
librium result but subject to the price distortion.
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Proposition 1. In the homogeneous model, 1) there always exists PMa > κPP
D
a ; 2) the
manufacturing goods gross output under DTS is always higher than market economy; 3)
when κP and Aa are small enough, the agricultural goods gross output under DTS is also
higher than that in market economy.
















































































Figure 1: Activation effect
Note: This figure compares the equilibrium in homogeneous model under DTS and market econ-
omy. Left panel illustrates the equilibrium prices, SS-DTS and SS-MKT is the agricultural goods
supply in urban (Ya − xR) under DTS and market economy respectively; DD-DTS and DD-MKT is
the agricultural goods demand in urban (aU + xU) under DTS and market economy respectively.
Right and middle panel illustrate the equilibrium outputs. The middle panel is agricultural goods
gross output, and the function forms are the same under DTS and market economy. The right




To illustrate the selection effect, we study the occupational choice in rural. For
simplicity, we assume enterprises are only located in urban and migration be-
tween rural and urban is allowed. Given Pa > P̄a, the constraint is always binding,
that is, Qa = Q̄ZRF. Then there is a cutoff of ability profile regarding occupational
choice in rural area













1−αa − (Pa − P̄a)Q̄ZRF},
and the ability profile of workers in enterprises is UE = {h : hE > L(hF)}, and for
farmers, it is RF = {h : hE < L(hF)}. Then, the direct effect of high procurement
16
is that, as Q̄ increases or P̄a decreases, more workers tend to work in enterprises
as shown in Figure 2.




land size ZRF is getting larger, then it will discourage the migration. Hence the
magnitude of effect is unclear even in partial equilibrium, and it will be further
examined in section 6.



















Figure 2: Selection effect
Note: This figure illustrates the response of occupational choice as procurement level changes,
with abilities below the line people will choose to work on farmland, while for those of abilities
above the line will choose to work in enterprises.
4.3 Misallocation effect
To illustrate the misallocation effect, we focus on urban enterprises’ behavior. For
simplicity, we assume enterprises are only located in urban and migration be-
tween rural and urban is not allowed. As shown in Appendix A.3, given a fixed
entry cost CU, there exists productivity cutoff z
∗
U, zL, zH such that the intermediate

















0 z ≤ z∗U
xL(z) z
∗
U < z ≤ zL
q̄ zL < z ≤ zH
xH(z) z > zH
















0 z ≤ z∗U
πL(z) z
∗
U < z ≤ zL
πM(z) zL < z ≤ zH
πH(z) z > zH
.
The interpretation is that the unproductive firm (z ≤ z∗U) will not enter the
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market. Low productive firm (z∗U < z ≤ zL) will have intermediate input under
the quota benefit (xL(z) < q̄).
9 There is a positive mass of firm that will have
intermediate input q̄. If the firm wants to buy agricultural goods above the quota
level, the marginal cost (price) of agricultural goods will jump from P̄a to Pa; hence,
firms with productivity slightly higher than zL may not be able to cover this cost
and stick to the quota level. Then the very productive firm will have a higher
intermediate input (xH(z) > q̄).
Figure 3 illustrates the demand and profit function. The left panel shows that
less firm will enter the market if there is no procurement (z∗ < z∗c ), and the right
panel shows that firm will invest less in intermediate goods if there is no pro-
curement as the dash line is below the solid line in the figure. The following
proposition summarizes results of comparative statics in partial equilibrium.
Proposition 2. With DTS, the entry level productivity z∗U is increasing in CU, P̄a, wU
and decreasing in AU, and the cutoff zL is increasing in P̄a, q̄, wU and decreasing in AU.
In addition, the welfare for rural (urban) people is decreasing (increasing) in procurement.



































Figure 3: Misallocation effect
Note: This figure illustrates the firm’s decision. The solid line represents the profit function in left
panel and intermediate goods demand function in the right panel, while the dash line represent
the result of removing the quota benefit and the intermediate goods is under the market price.
9The existence of xL(z) < q̄ is due to no second-hand market, otherwise firms can sell quota
benefit under the market price and hence they will buy intermediate goods at least at quota level




As in Brandt et al. (2018), firm productivity z follows Pareto distribution with
minimal productivity zR,min = zU,min = 1, that is, F(z) = 1 − (
1
z )
θj , z > 1, j =
U, R, with θR = θU = 1.05, and we also set γR = γU = 0.15. In addition, as
in Adamopoulos et al. (2017), the abilities jointly follow log normal distribution








are µF = 0.16, µE = 0.88, σF = 1.48, σE = 0.95, and σFE = −0.35, that is to
say, ability hF and hE are negatively correlated. On the contrary, Lagakos and




F , G2(hE) = e
−h
−θE
E and the parameters are θF = 5.3, θE = 2.7,
ρ = 3.5.10 As the result in Adamopoulos et al. (2017) is based on Chinese data, we
assume that it also follows joint log normal distribution in our study.
The potential mass of enterprises MR, MU are assumed to proportional to la-
bor force in rural enterprises and urban enterprises respectively, without losing
generality, we assume that MR = LRE, MU = LU. In addition, LR, LU are from
employment ratio in rural and urban, respectively; P̄aPa is the procurement to mar-
ket price ratio; from the Input-Output table, the share of intermediate goods in
nonagricultural goods in agricultural production is αa = 0.157, which is lower
than 0.4 in the US as in Restuccia et al. (2008). The share of agricultural goods
used as intermediate goods is αR(1 − γR) = 0.066, which is much lower than the
average share of the intermediate goods 0.68 in Jones (2011). This share gives




0.46 , which implies η = 0.439. Then the land share is (1 − αa)η = 0.370
and labor share is αaη = 0.473, which are close to those in Adamopoulos et al.
(2017). We set θ = 0.005 as in literature (e.g. Chen (2017) ). Table 1 summarizes
the results.
We calibrate the rest of parameters in two steps. First, we target the average
value between 1978 and 1992 in the data. Urban productivity AU is normalized as
1. Agricultural productivity Aa is calibrated to match the output ratio between ru-
10 In Lagakos and Waugh (2013), joint distribution takes the following function form:
G(hF, hE) = Cp[G1(hF), G2(hE)], hF > 0, hE > 0,
where








ral enterprise and agriculture YR/Ya where YR is the real value of output in TVE,
Ya is the total real value of agricultural output selling in market and under pro-
curement. Rural productivity AR is calibrated to match the output ratio between
urban and rural enterprises YU/YR where YU is the real value of output in urban.
The entry costs are calibrated as in Brandt et al. (2018) that assuming that the hu-
man capital of a margin firm is 1, that is, HR(z
∗
R) = 1,and HU(z
∗
U) = 1, hence
the entry cost can be written as Cj =
γjwj
(1−αj)(1−γj)
, j = R, U. The welfare weight
χU is calibrated to match market share (ms) which is defined as the proportion
of agricultural goods value selling in market to the total value. Subsistence level
ā is calibrated to match the employment share in rural enterprises LRE/LR; and
total land size Z̄ is calibrated to match the average earning ratio between urban
and rural EU/ER, where EU, ER are the average household disposable income in
urban and rural respectively.
Table 2 lists the parameters in this step. Generally the model matches the av-
erage value well except for it overestimates the employment ratio in rural enter-
prises. Note that χU = 0.9178 implies the government value urban much higher
than rural. This is consistent with the real economy that, at the beginning of re-
form the urban is favored by the policy.11 In addition, CR < CU implies the entry
cost in rural is much lower than that in urban. It is consistent with facts in Figure
C.4 that, in the early stage, there is a large number of TVEs entering the market.
Second, we assume total land size Z̄ is constant across year and calibrate other
parameters year by year. In particular, CR, CU, MR, MU and ā, χU are calibrated
in the same way as the first step. The productivities Aa, AR, AU are calibrated to
match the real outputs Ya, YR, YU year by year by normalizing the average val-
ues to be 1. Table 3 summarizes the parameters. In the calibration, we simulate
the model and minimize the error between the simulated moment and the data
moment as in Lagakos and Waugh (2013), and the detail of this algorithm is in
Appendix B.
Figure 4 presents the model and data for targeted moments in each year where
the dash line represents the data and the solid line represents the model for tar-
geted variables where the output Ya, YR, YU are normalized as 1 in average for
both the data and the model. It shows the model matches data well. Moreover,
Figure 5 shows it also match the following un-targeted moments well: agricul-
tural goods price (Pa), average earning in rural and urban (ER, EU), procurement
level (Q̄). The dash line is data and the solid line is model. All the variables are
11This is said in the early stage of development that “help some people get rich first and then
help the others”.
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normalized as 1 in average value for both the data and the model. Finally, Figure
6 presents the parameters across years, including agricultural productivity (Aa),
rural productivity (AR), urban productivity (AU), weight on urban in social wel-
fare (χU), number of potential entrant in urban and rural (MU, MR), entry costs in
urban and rural (CU, CR). It shows that there is a clear trend of all the parameters
which is important for counterfactual analysis.
Table 1: Parameters without solving model
parameters value target or source
αj αR = αU = 0.078,αa = 0.157 Input-Output table
η 0.439 Adamopoulos et al. (2017)
γR, γU 0.15 Brandt et al. (2018)
µF, µE, σF, σFE, σE µF = 0.16, µE = 0.88, σF = 1.48, σFE = −0.35, σE = 0.95 Adamopoulos et al. (2017)
θR, θU 1.05 Brandt et al. (2018)
θ 0.005 Chen (2017)
Note: This table lists the parameters calibrated without solving the model. αj, j = a, R, U,
η, γR, γU are the share in production function calculated from the Input-Output table and
the literature (Adamopoulos et al. (2017), Brandt et al. (2018)), µF, µE, σF, σFE, σE are the
parameters of productivity distribution adopted from Adamopoulos et al. (2017), θR, θU
are the parameters of ability distribution from Brandt et al. (2018), θ is the preference
parameter ( Chen (2017).)
Table 2: Parameters in average
parameters description value target model data
Aa agricultural productivity 0.0418 YR/Ya 1.2243 1.4653
AR TVE productivity 0.2184 YU/YR 3.9809 4.1039
χU welfare weight 0.9178 ms 0.3139 0.2674
ā subsistence level 0.0106 LRE/LR 0.3595 0.1651
CR entry cost in rural 0.0166 HR(z
∗
R) = 1
CU entry cost in urban 0.1041 HU(z
∗
U) = 1
MR potential entrant 0.1226 LRE 0.1226 0.1226
MU potential entrant 0.2550 LU 0.2550 0.2550
Z̄ total land size 3.1810 EU/ER 2.9317 2.2174
Note: This table lists the parameters calibrating targets in average value from 1978 to
1992. Aa, AR are productivities, χU is welfare weight on urban household, ā is subsis-
tence level in utility function, CR, CU are the entry cost in rural and urban, MR, MU are
the potential entrant in rural and urban, Z̄ is the total land size.
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Table 3: Parameters across years
parameters description target
Aa agriculture productivity Ya
AR TVE productivity YR
AU urban productivity YU
MR potential entrant in rural LRE
MU potential entrant in urban LU
χU welfare weight in urban ms
ā subsistence level of agricultural goods LRE/LR
CR entry cost in rural HR(z
∗
R) = 1
CU entry cost in urban HU(z
∗
U) = 1
Note: This table lists the parameters calibrating targets year by year. Aa, AR, AU are
productivity, MR, MU are the potential entrants in rural and urban, χU is welfare weight
on urban household, ā is subsistence level in utility function, CR, CU are the entry costs.

























































Figure 4: Model fit: targeted moments
Note: This figure compares the model with data for targeted moments. The dash line is data and






































Figure 5: Model fit: untargeted moments
Note: This figure compares the model with data for untargeted moments: agricultural goods price
(Pa), average earning in rural and urban (ER, EU), procurement level (Q̄). The dash line is data and
the solid line is model. All the variables are normalized as 1 in average value for both the data and
the model.
























































Note: This figure presents parameters across years: agricultural productivity (Aa), rural produc-
tivity (AR), urban productivity (AU), weight on urban in social welfare (χU), number of potential
entrant in urban and rural (MU , MR), entry costs in urban and rural (CU , CR).
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6 Quantitative analysis
With the parameters calibrated, we quantitatively analyze the impact of DTS in
several experiments. Firstly, we take 1978 as benchmark and do counterfactual
analysis on different factors, and we also study the scenario when switching to
market economy in 1978. Secondly, we take each year of 1979-1992 as bench-
mark and study the effect when parameters are set with 1978’s values. Thirdly,
we decompose the impact of different channels on economic growth and welfare.
Fourthly, we study the economy with second-hand market and frictionless econ-
omy as two extensions.
6.1 Counterfactual analysis
To understand the mechanism and importance of each factor, we take 1978 as
benchmark and set parameters with 1992’s value. In Table 4, the column of “bench-
mark” is the results in 1978, and each column under “counterfactual case” lists the
results when setting this parameter in 1992’s value while keeping others the same
as in 1978; and in the column of “market”, we set P̄aPa = 1 and Q̄ = 0, that is,
the government doesn’t set procurement requirement. The results show that if
Table 4: Counterfactual analysis in 1978
variable benchmark
counterfactual result (value)
Aa AR AU P̄a/Pa χU market
Ya 0.073 0.227 0.085 0.087 0.073 0.072 0.071
YR 0.01 0.004 0.166 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002
YU 2.264 2.374 2.228 4.788 2.126 2.211 2.159
LRF/LR 0.743 0.793 0.392 0.704 0.955 0.898 0.971
ms 0.112 0.464 0.809 0.188 0.156 0.529 1
Y 2.408 2.528 2.51 5.084 2.251 2.415 2.299
xa 0.04 0.038 0.024 0.085 0.023 0.05 0.026
M∗R 0.306 0.147 0.763 0.151 0.082 0.093 0.069
M∗U 0.116 0.128 0.129 0.237 0.101 0.114 0.102
VR -1.93 -1.806 -0.981 -1.689 -1.681 -1.458 -1.566
VU 0.448 0.467 0.455 0.636 0.449 0.444 0.447
Vtotal 0.423 0.443 0.439 0.611 0.426 0.39 0.425
Note: The column of “benchmark” lists results in 1978, and each column under “counter-
factual case (value)” list the results setting the parameter with 1992’s value while keeping
others the same as in 1978; in the column of “market”, we set P̄aPa = 1 and Q̄ = 0.
the economy was set to market economy, the total output (Y) would decrease by
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4.5%. This could be explained by two effects in the model. First, the selection ef-
fect was weakened as the employment ratio on farmers (LRF/LR) increased from
0.743 to 0.971, and there were less active firms in rural (M∗R) and lower output
(YR). Second, the misallocation was also alleviated as the procurement price was
as high as market price, and there were less active firms in urban (M∗U) and lower
output (YU). Furthermore, as the total output of manufacturing goods was lower,
the intermediate goods in agricultural goods production (xa) was less. Combining
it with the result that the number of farmers were more could explain the result
of slight change of agricultural goods output (Ya). In contrast to output, the im-
pact on welfare is more significant. Although there is not much change on urban
welfare (VU), the rural welfare (VR) has increased from −1.93 to −1.566. Given
the logarithm utility function, we compute the the equivalent consumption (EC)
as the value generating the utility, hence EC of VR has increased by 43.9%.
In addition, the procurement price ratio ( P̄aPa ) has similar impact as the market
economy. The total output would decrease by 6.5%, and the EC for rural would in-
crease by 28.3%. While the weight on urban (χU) would increase the rural welfare
by 60.3%, it slightly increase the total output by 0.3%. Finally, the counterfactual
analysis on productivities (Aa, AR, AU) shows that they would have higher im-
pact on output. For example, if Aa was set with the value in 1992, the agricultural
output would increase from 0.073 to 0.227, and the total output would increase
from 2.408 to 2.528. And it could benefit both rural and urban people, in particu-
lar, the EC for rural, urban and all people would increase by 13.2%, 1.9%, and 2%
respectively. The results for AR and AUare similar and presented in Table 4.
6.2 Results across years
In this counterfactual analysis, we take each year of 1979-1992 as benchmark and
set the parameters with 1978’s values. The results are presented in Figure 7. It
shows the counterfactual result of market economy in each year is similar to that
in 1978, that is, if the economy were switched to market economy directly, VR
would be higher and YR would be lower. It means that rural people would be
better off in market economy, but the rural enterprises would be worse off.
In addition, Figure 8 presents the counterfactual analysis results on P̄aPa and χU.
In the counterfactual case, the welfare for rural people (VR) would be lower and
rural enterprise output (YR) would be higher. This result is intuitive given the
procurement price is lower and χU is relative higher (government favored urban








































































Figure 7: Counterfactual result: market economy
Note: The dash line represents the results in benchmark economy, and the solid line represents
the counterfactual results in market economy. Ya, YR, YU , Y are output of agriculture, rural enter-
prises, urban enterprises and total output respectively, LRF/LR, ms are employment ratio of farmer

































































Figure 8: Counterfactual result: DTS
Note: The dash line represents the results of benchmark economy, and the solid line represents the
counterfactual results by setting P̄aPa and χU in 1978’s values. Ya, YR, YU , Y are output of agriculture,
rural enterprises, urban enterprises and total output respectively, LRF/LR, ms are employment




In this subsection, we compare DTS with other factors in a decomposition ex-
ercise. First, we group the parameters into following channels: productivities
(Aa, AR, AU), DTS (χU,
P̄a
Pa
), firm mass (MU, MR), employment ratio (LU, LR) and
entry cost (CU, CR). Then we set the year of 1992 as baseline economy, and each
time we compute the counterfactual result by setting the parameter with 1978’s
value. Denote the counterfactual result of variable X on channel i as Xi, we com-
pute the ratio si =
X1992−Xi
X1992−X1978
to measure how much the result will change under
counterfactual case relative to the change in benchmark, where X1978 and X1992are
the benchmark result in 1978 and 1992 respectively. The contribution of each chan-
nel is computed as cti =
si
∑ si
presenting the importance of channel i relative to
other channels. We also compute the residue as 1 − ∑ si to capture the impact
from all the other factors in the model (e.g. subsistence level ā) and out of the
model. The results of this exercise is summarized in Table 5. While ∑ si is always
Table 5: Decomposition
variable model(1978) model(1992) (Aa, AR, AU) (χU,
P̄a
Pa
) (MU, MR) (LU, LR) (CU, CR) residue
Ya 0.073 0.24 1.021 -0.181 -0.043 -0.038 -0.043 0.285
YR 0.01 0.137 1.065 -0.026 0.129 0.083 0.117 -0.367
YU 2.264 5.617 0.944 0.036 0.034 0.146 -0.002 -0.159
Y 2.408 6.079 0.936 0.044 0.026 0.133 -0.007 -0.133
ZRF 4.459 6.024 1.04 -0.858 0.104 0.184 0.082 0.448
VR -1.93 -0.571 0.712 0.141 -0.054 0.024 -0.066 0.242
VU 0.448 0.721 0.873 -0.019 0.022 0.275 -0.009 -0.143
Vtotal 0.423 0.685 0.955 -0.113 0.018 0.28 -0.015 -0.124
Note: In this table, column “model(1978)” and “model(1992)” are the bench-










,where Xi is the counterfactual result, and X1978 and X1992




, which captures the impact from all the other factors in the model and
out of the model.
positive, cti could be negative, in which case, counterfactual result Xi is higher
than X1992. For example, the impact of DTS on (Ya, YR, VU, Vtotal) are negative,
which means that DTS was successful on improving the agricultural output, TVE
output, urban welfare and total welfare. This is consistent with the change of
selection effect: in the counterfactual case, the average land size (ZRF) would be
higher than baseline economy. On the other hand, the impact on (YU, Y, VR) are
positive, meaning that adjustment of DTS from 1978 to 1992 has accelerated the
growth of urban enterprise and the total output and rural welfare.
On the magnitude, productivities are the main contributor to both output and
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welfare which is consistent with Zhu (2012). DTS plays a negative role on (Ya, Vtotal),
and the contribution (absolute value) is 18.1% and 11.3%; on the other hand, it
contributes positively to (Y, VR) with contribution of 4.4% and 14.1%.
6.4 Second-hand market
In the baseline model, we assume there is no second-hand market, so that urban
enterprise can use the quota benefit only for production. In this subsection, we
add second-hand market in the baseline economy. Firms can sell quota benefit
under the market price and hence they will buy intermediate goods at least at
quota level regardless productivity. In this case, quota is essentially a subsidy of
(Pa − P̄a)q̄, and firm’s problem is
max
HU>0,xU>0
PmyU(z)− wU HU − PaxU + (Pa − P̄a)q̄
















Therefore, in this case, more firms will enter the market. In addition, we assume
the procurement level is the same as that in the baseline model, which means
government takes as granted that there is a full commitment of no second hand
market when marking decision, and the quota benefit is determined by budget




Table 6: Counterfactual analysis in 1978: second-hand and frictionless economy
variable benchmark second-hand frictionless
Ya 0.073 0.075 0.066
YR 0.01 0.006 6.646
YU 2.264 2.173 6.646
LRF/LR 0.743 0.59 0.102
ms 0.112 0.162 1
Y 2.408 2.268 7.073
VR -1.93 -2.376 1.242
VU 0.448 0.46 0.374
Vtotal 0.423 0.43 0.383
Note: In this table, the column “benchmark” presents benchmark results in 1978,
“second-hand” presents counterfactual results in economy with second-hand market,






















































Figure 9: Counterfactual result: second-hand market
Note: This figure compares output in benchmark economy and second-hand economy, the dash
line is the value for benchmark model, and the solid line is for second-hand economy. Ya, YR, YU , Y
are output of agriculture, rural enterprises, urban enterprises and total output respectively,
LRF/LR, ZRF, xa, ms are employment ratio of farmer in rural, average land size, intermediate good


































































Figure 10: Counterfactual result: second-hand market
Note: This figure compares welfare in benchmark economy and second-hand economy, the dash
line is the value for benchmark model, and the solid line is for second-hand economy. VR, VU , V
are welfare of rural, urban and total welfare respectively, M∗R, xR, wR, M
∗
U , xU , wU are number of
active firms in rural, intermediate goods in TVE, wage rate in rural, number of active firms in
urban, intermediate goods in urban enterprises and wage rate in urban respectively.
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6.4.1 Comparison with benchmark economy
We compare the results in Figure 9 and Figure 10. The dash line represents the
benchmark value and solid line is the counterfactual economy. There is not much
change in output of different sectors, but the welfare changed significantly. As
shown in Figure 9, the lower welfare in rural is mainly due to the lower labor
force and intermediate input and less active firms in rural although the wage rate
and land size is higher. The higher welfare in urban is due to higher wage rate
and more active firms in the urban as shown in Figure 10. To compare the results
precisely, Table 6 presents the results in 1978, and it shows that comparing to
benchmark, the total output will decrease by 6%, the rural welfare will decrease
from −1.93 to −2.376, in terms of CE, it decreases by 36%.
6.5 Frictionless economy
In this subsection, we will compare the benchmark economy with a fully fric-
tionless economy by removing procurement, labor mobility barrier and land rent
restriction. For simplicity, we assume that urban people in urban will only work
in enterprises (rural or urban), and people in rural can work in enterprises (rural
or urban) or work as a farmer. Given the land rent market, farmers choose inter-







1−η)(1−αa)xαaa − Pmxa − R(ZRF − Z̄/LR).
When choosing to work in RF, the net income for farmer with ability h is given by







where Π = ΠR + ΠU is the total profit by both rural and urban enterprises and
L = LR + LU is the total labor force. When allowing migration, the indifference
condition V(IRU) = V(IRF) implies the cutoff curve





As there is full mobility on migration, the wage rate in rural enterprise and urban
enterprise should be the same, wR = wU = w. Then the objective for firm is
max
Hj,xj
Pmyj(z)− wHj − Paxj, j = R, U
Equilibrium The equilibrium in frictionless economy is characterized by agri-
cultural input quantity {ZRF(h), xa(h)}, enterprises input {H
D
j (z), xj(z)}, labor
supply {HSj }, land rent R, wage rate w, and goods price Pa, Pm, such that
1. {ZRF(h), xa(h)} maximizes rural farmer’s income
2. {HDj (z), xj(z)} maximizes enterprise profit
3. {HSj } is the result of occupational choice
4. R, w, Pa, Pm clear land market, labor markets and goods markets
(a) Land market clear, Z̄ = LR
∫
RF ZRF(h)dG(h)







(c) Agricultural goods market clear, Ya = xU + aR + aU
(d) Manufacturing goods market clear, YR + YU = xa + mR + mU
6.5.1 Comparison with benchmark economy
Figure 11 and Figure 12 compare the output and welfare in two economies. The
dash line represents the benchmark value and solid line is the result in frictionless
economy. The agricultural output would be lower if there were no friction, while
output in rural and urban enterprises, total output would be higher than baseline
model. While the welfare in rural would be higher, it would be lower in urban
and the total welfare would be also lower.
As shown in Figure 11, the lower output of agricultural goods is mainly due
to the less labor force although the land size and intermediate goods is higher.
The higher level output in rural enterprise is due to more labor force, and higher
output in urban is due to more active firms as shown in Figure 12. In addition, the
higher welfare in rural is due to the land rent in frictionless economy; the lower
welfare in urban is due to the lower wage rate in urban. More precisely, Table 6
presents the results in 1978, and it shows that comparing to benchmark, the total
output would be tripled, and the rural welfare would increase from −1.93 to 1.242,






















































Figure 11: Counterfactual result: frictionless economy
Note: This figure compares results in benchmark economy and frictionless economy, the dash line
is the value for benchmark model, and the solid line is for frictionless economy. Ya, YR, YU , Y
are output of agriculture, rural enterprises, urban enterprises and total output respectively,
LRF/LR, ZRF, xa, ms are employment ratio of farmer in rural, average land size, intermediate good
































































Figure 12: Counterfactual result: frictionless economy
Note: This figure compares the welfare in benchmark economy and frictionless economy, the dash
line is the value for benchmark model, and the solid line is for frictionless economy. VR, VU , V are
welfare of rural, urban and total welfare respectively, M∗R, xR, R, M
∗
U , xU , w are number of active
firms in rural, intermediate goods in TVE, land rent, number of active firms in urban, intermediate
goods in urban enterprises and wage rate respectively.
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7 Discussion
The model abstracts from both migration and capital for simplicity as it already
had heterogeneity on both firms and workers. How would it affect our results?
While it is believed that both capital and migration might have contributed to
Chinese economic growth significantly for the past over 40 years, results from
data and literature show that might not be the case from 1978 to 1992.
Migration In reality, there is migration from rural to urban areas from 1978 to
1992; however, it is highly restricted under the “Hukou” system. In particular,
the total number of migrants in 1978 and 1992 was 1.484 million and 1.6 million
respectively, and rural population was 790 million and 848 million respectively,
hence the migration rate was 0.19% in both years. This is pretty low given this
ratio is 41.5% in 2016 (245 out of 589.73). In addition, no migration doesn’t mean
rural people can only work on farmland, instead, we emphasize the role of TVEs
in the rural. To absorb the surplus rural labor force, more TVEs were established,
particularly after 1984. As shown in Figure C.4, both the number of TVEs and its
employment share in rural areas had increased. In particular, as there was a large
increase in the number of private TVEs in 1984, the output value share of which
increased from 15% to 30%.
Capital In the model, neither agricultural nor manufacturing goods produc-
tion requires capital, which might contradict to the belief that the investment has
played an important role in China’s development. However, there are some ev-
idence showing that may not be the case from 1978 to 1992 and this assumption
might not hurt our main result. First, the data shows that capital to labor ratio
keep relatively constant from 1978 to 1992, and it surged only after 1997 (Brandt
and Zhu (2010)). Second, the accounting exercise shows that the contribution of
capital to output ratio to per capita GDP growth is only 0.51% from 1978 to 2007,
whereas TFP contributes to 77.9% (Zhu (2012)). Therefore, as we focus on labor




This paper studied the formation of market economy in China from 1978 to 1992.
We built a model and analyzed allocation, prices, and welfare in China during
this DTS period by emphasizing three main mechanisms. Firstly, as urban enter-
prises enjoy the quota benefit, the gross manufacturing output could be larger,
which in turn increased the agricultural goods output as the intermediate goods
supply increased. Secondly, procurement requirement played a role as screening
machine–only rural people with relative high farming ability stayed as farmers.
Thirdly, some low productive firms in urban can survive due to quota benefit,
whereas firms with higher productivity in rural may not survive.
The quantitative analysis showed that directly switching to market economy
in 1978 would decrease total output by 4.5% but increase rural welfare by 43.9%
in equivalent consumption. That is to say, on the extensive margin, DTS has ac-
tivated Chinese economy with scarifying rural’s welfare. On the other hand, on
the intensive margin, from 1978 to 1992, the DTS has improved as procurement
price is getting closer to market price. This change had contributed positively to
total output by 4.4% and rural welfare by 14.1%, and it contributed negatively to
agricultural output by 18.1% and total welfare by 11.3%. The quantitative results
also confirmed that productivity improvement contributed mostly to Chinese eco-
nomic growth.
Furthermore, in the economy with second-hand market, there is not much
change in output of different sectors, but the welfare changed significantly. For
example, comparing to benchmark in 1978, the total output would decrease by
6%, the rural welfare will decrease by 36%. However, in frictionless economy, the
impact is much larger. The total output in 1978 would be tripled comparing to
benchmark, and the rural welfare would increase by more than 23 times.
The current Chinese economy is still under transition, and internal markets
are still partially open; some markets, such as the credit market, are still under
DTS. Therefore, this framework can be easily applied to other scenarios, and the
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To illustrate the activation effect, we simplify the model in the following way. Both
worker’s ability and firm’s productivity are homogeneous, agricultural goods are
produced in rural, enterprises are located only in urban, and there is no migration.
Procurement is determined by the government to maximize the total welfare.
A.1.1 Partial equilibrium
Given agricultural goods price Pa, manufacturing goods price Pm, and labor sup-










P̄a if xU ≤ q̄



























0 if xU ≤ q̄
(Pa − P̄a)Q̄Z̄ if xU > q̄
.
Since there is no migration, ZRF =
Z̄
LR






















)αU LU if xU > q̄
.
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. The labor pro-
















)αU if xU > q̄
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1−αa ZRF − Q̄ZRF(Pa − P̄a)− Pa ā},





[θlog( θPa ) + (1 − θ)log(
1−θ
Pm





P̄a − Pa ā] if xU ≤ q̄
[θlog( θPa ) + (1 − θ)log(
1−θ
Pm








− Pa ā] if xU > q̄
,
then VU is increasing in Q̄ and decreasing in P̄a.
Lastly, the government is to maximize weighted total welfare, that is,
max
q̄,Q̄≥0
χU LUVU(IU) + (1 − χU)LRFVR(IRF)
s.t.min{xU, q̄} = Q̄Z̄.
In the case of xU > q̄, the objective function is
max
Q̄≥0
χU LU log[wU +
(Pa − P̄a)Q̄Z̄
LU
− Pa ā]+ (1−χU)LRFlog[(1− αa)Paya − (Pa − P̄a)Q̄ZRF − Pa ā].
Solving the problem implies
Q̄ =
[(1 − αa)Paya − Pa ā] +
1−χU
χU




+ 1)(Pa − P̄a)
,
then Q̄ is increasing in χU. The following proposition summarizes the partial equi-
librium results in the case of xU > q̄.
Proposition 3. In the homogeneous model, the procurement quantity Q̄ is increasing
in χU; the gross output of manufacturing goods and labor productivity in urban are
weakly decreasing in procurement price P̄a; the welfare of rural (urban) people is decreas-
ing(increasing) in procurement level and increasing (decreasing) in procurement price.
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A.1.2 General equilibrium










+ (1 − θ)ā]LU if xU ≤ q̄








Q̄Z̄] + (1 − θ)āLU if xU > q̄
,
in rural it is








Q̄Z̄}+ (1 − θ)āLRF,





( P̄aαaPm AU )
1
αU−1 LU if xU ≤ q̄
( PaαaPm AU )
1
αU−1 LU if xU > q̄
.
Denote P̄aPa = κP, and normalize Pm = 1, in the case of xU ≤ q̄, market clear
condition requires Ya − aR = aU + xU, then the following equation will pin down
equilibrium price PDa
[1 − θ(1 − αa)]Aa[αaPa Aa]
αa
1−αa Z̄ + θ(1 − κP)Q̄Z̄ − [(1 − θ)ā]LRF









such that ( κPPaαa AU )
1
αU−1 LU ≤ Q̄Z̄, then Pa ≥ (
Q̄Z̄
LU
)αU−1 αa AUκP . Given the equilibrium


















On the other hand, the equilibrium condition in market economy implies
[1 − θ(1 − αa)]Aa[αaPa Aa]
αa
1−αa Z̄ − [(1 − θ)ā]LRF


























A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1
First, we can show that PMa > κPP
D
a . Suppose not, the RHS of equation (21) is
smaller than (22), however, in this case, LHS of equation (21) is larger than (22),
this contradiction implies the only case is PMa > κPP
D








a then equation (21) and (22) will pin down
productivity A∗a . In particular, and
A∗a = {





− θ(1 − κP)Q̄Z̄
























≤ 1, this condition can
be satisfied when κP is small enough. If Aa < (>)A
∗
a , as the RHS of (21) is steeper
than (22), then PMa < (>)P
D





In sum, we conclude: 1) In the equilibrium, there always exists PMa > κPP
D
a ; 2)
the manufacturing goods under DTS is always higher than that in market econ-
omy; 3) when κP and Aa are small enough, the agricultural goods under DTS is
higher than that in market economy. Q.E.D
A.2 Heterogenous ability
In this setting, we assume enterprises are only located in urban, and migration
between rural and urban is allowed. Farmers choose intermediate input to maxi-
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1−η)βa xαaa − Pmxa,
























hence ya(h) is increasing in
Pa
Pm
. In the rural, land is equally distributed among
farmers, that is, ZRF =
Z̄
LRF
, and as long as Pa > P̄a, farmers will only satisfy
the procurement requirement, Qa = Q̄ZRF. For the worker choosing to work on
farmland, the net income is
IRF(h) = Pa((1 − αa)ya(h)− Q̄ZRF) + P̄aQ̄ZRF,





) + (1 − θ)log(
1 − θ
Pm
)] + log(I − Pa ā),
maximizing utility is equivalent to maximize the total income. The margin profile
for occupational choice is













1−αa − (Pa − P̄a)Q̄ZRF].
Then, the ability profile of a worker in urban is UE = {h : hE > L(hF)} and that
of a farmer is RF = {h : hE < L(hF)}.
In addition, given HU = LR
∫
RU hEdG(h) + LU
∫
hEdG(h), the total human




















hence HU is increasing in Q̄ and decreasing in P̄a. Since YU is increasing in HU,
the gross output of manufacturing goods YU is increasing in procurement level Q̄
and decreasing in P̄a.
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In this setting, we assume enterprises are only located in urban, and migration
between rural and urban is not allowed.
A.3.1 Enterprises in urban areas
Intermediate goods producers maximize the profit, and at xU = q̄, there is a jump





max yU(z)− wU HU − P̄axU − CU if xU ≤ q̄
max yU(z)− wU HU − Pa(xU − q̄)− P̄a q̄ − CU if xU > q̄
.







































)θU . In this case, the procurement has a direct impact on this
cutoff, which is summarized in the following Lemma
Lemma 4. In urban area, the entry level productivity z∗U is increasing in CU, P̄a, wU
and decreasing in AU. In addition, if procurement price is lower, more urban enterprises,
particularly those with low productivity will enter the market.





such that the interior
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solution satisfies xU(z) < q̄, substituting ȳ
L















and the following proposition states features of this cutoff
Lemma 5. In urban area, the cutoff zL is increasing in P̄a, q̄, wU and decreasing in AU.
If firms tend to purchase agricultural goods above the quota level, the marginal
cost (price) of agricultural goods will jump from P̄a to Pa; hence, firms with pro-
ductivity slightly higher than zL may not be able to cover this cost and then stick
to the quota level. In other words, there is another cutoff productivity zH such
that, if firm productivity is lower than zH, then it is profitable to purchase agricul-
tural goods at quota level. Denoted πHU (z)(π
M
U (z)) the profit functions when firm
purchases intermediate goods more than (same as) quota level.








πMU (z) = [1 − βU(1 − γU)]y
M
U (z)− P̄aq̄,
and yMU (z) = z
γU
1−βU (1−γU ) ȳMU where






1−βU (1−γU ) .











πHU (z) = γUy
H
U (z) + (Pa − P̄a)q̄,




















U + Paq̄ = [1 − βU(1 − γU)]z
γU
1−βU (1−γU ) ȳMU , (23)
and it will pin down another cutoff zH(> zL) such that if z > zH then x(z) > q̄,
the following Lemma shows there is an unique solution to equation (23).
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Lemma 6. In the domain {z : z > zL}, there is an unique solution to equation (23).
Prof: Define function f (z) = πMU (z) − π
H
U (z) in the domain of {z : z ≥ 0}, note
that πMU (z) is concave in z, f (z) is concave, f (0) < 0, f (+∞) < 0, since at z = zL,
those staying with quota level enjoy lower agricultural prices, then f (zL) > 0; thus, there
are two solutions to equation (23), one is larger than zL and the other is smaller than zL.
Since both sides of the equation (23) increase in quota level q̄, its impact on
zH is ambiguous. As the price of agricultural goods input jumps from P̄a to Pa at
point x = q̄, it will motivate a positive measure of the mass of firms that purchase
agricultural goods at the level x = q̄.


















0 z ≤ z∗U
xL(z) z
∗
U < z ≤ zL
q̄ zL < z ≤ zH
xH(z) z > zH
















0 z ≤ z∗U
πL(z) z
∗
U < z ≤ zL
πM(z) zL < z ≤ zH
πH(z) z > zH


































































The labor productivity in rural is










and labor productivity in urban is
LPm = (1 − αU)YU/LU.
A.3.3 Welfare

















) + (1 − θ)log(
1 − θ
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then we have following Lemma
Lemma 7. Welfare VR(VU) is decreasing(increasing) in Q̄.
A.4 Quantitative model
This section solves the benchmark model in 3. The behavior for urban enterprises
is the same as the model in section A.3, then we only discuss others in the follow-
ing.
A.4.1 Enterprises in rural
As the rural enterprises do not have the benefit of quotas, the price of agricultural
goods is Pa, the profit is
πR(z) = max yR(z)− wRHR − PaxR − CR,





















The entry-level productivity is z∗R =
CR
γR ȳR
















The aggregate profit in rural enterprises is ΠR = MR
∫ ∞
z∗R
πR(z)dF(z), and it will
be redistributed across all people in rural. The demand for human capital in rural













The following proposition describes features related to z∗R
Proposition 8. In the rural areas, the entry-level productivity z∗R is increasing in CR,Pa,
wR and decreasing in AR; however, neither procurement price nor quantity affect this
cutoff directly.
A.4.2 Workers in rural
Farmers face the same problem as in heterogenous ability model. For the worker
choosing to work on farmland, the net income is












) + (1 − θ)log(
1 − θ
Pm
)] + log(I − Pa ā),
maximizing utility is equivalent to maximize the total income. The margin profile
for occupational choice is













1−αa − (Pa − P̄a)Q̄ZRF}.
Then, the ability profile of a worker in rural enterprises is RE = {h : hE > L(hF)}
and that of a farmer is RF = {h : hE < L(hF)}. The total number of farmers is
LRF = LR
∫







Government is to maximize weighted total welfare, that is,
max
q̄,Q̄≥0
V(q̄, Q̄) =χU LU
∫
U










min{xU(z), q̄}dF(z) = Q̄Z̄.
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IRF(h) = (1 − αa)Paya(h) +
ΠR
LR




= −(Pa − P̄a)ZRF, and IRE(h) = wRhE +
ΠR
LR
is independent on pro-
curement level Q̄, then
∂IRE(h)
∂Q̄












































IU(h, q̄)− Pa ā







IRF(h, Q̄)− Pa ā
dG(h)]
A.4.4 Markets clear



































and agricultural goods consumption is ai(h) =
θ Ii(h)+(1−θ)Pa ā
Pa
, i = RF, RE, UE.
Denote aU and aR = aRF + aRE the aggregate consumption of agricultural goods










RE hEdG(h) + θΠR
LRE
LR






RF(1 − αa)Paya(h)dG(h)− θ(Pa − P̄a)Q̄Z̄ + θΠR
LRF
LR
+ (1 − θ)Pa āLRF
Pa
.
The total supply for agricultural goods is YSa = LR
∫
RF ya(h)dG(h), and the total
demand for agricultural goods is
YDa = xR + xL + xM + xH + aR + aU.
Then market clear implies YDa = Y
S
a
Manufacturing goods Manufacturing goods consumption is
mi(h) =
(1 − θ)Ii(h)− (1 − θ)Pa ā
Pm
, i = RF, RE, UE,
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then the aggregate demand for manufacturing goods in consumption is
mU =
(1 − θ)wU LU
∫






RE hEdG(h) + (1 − θ)ΠR
LRE
LR






RF(1 − αa)Paya(h)dG(h)− (1 − θ)(Pa − P̄a)Q̄Z̄ + (1 − θ)ΠR
LRF
LR
− (1 − θ)Pa āLRF
Pm
.
In addition, the demand for manufacturing goods as intermediate goods is xa =
LR
∫
RF xa(h)dG(h), and the total demand for manufacturing goods is
YDm = xa + mRE + mRF + mU.
The total supply of manufacturing goods is YSm = YU + YR. Market clear implies
YSm = Y
D




j , j = R, U. Finally, quota




min{xU(z), q̄}dF(z) = Q̄Z̄.
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B Simulation
In calibration, we simulate the model to minimize the error between simulated
moment and data moment as in Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and solve the equilib-
rium by following the path described in Chen (2017).
1. Let Θ = {θi : θi > θi,min, θi < θi,max} the set of parameters needs to be
calibrated.
2. Guess a group of θ from Θ, simulate the model, and solve equilibrium.
(a) Draw workers in both rural and urban h = (hF, hE), and the two types
of abilities follow log normal distribution as in Adamopoulos et al.
(2017)
(b) Draw firms in rural (zR) and urban (zU) areas that follow Pareto distri-
bution as in Brandt et al. (2018)
(c) In a simulated economy, all the agents make an occupational choice,
and the equilibrium is solved by clearing all the markets.
(d) Compute the moments in the simulated economy, and then, compute
the distance to the data moments.
3. Repeat step 2 with different guesses in step 1, and pick up the parameters θ
that give the lowest error.
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market trade to total trade ratio: NBS 1950−1992
Figure C.1: Procurement price and market share
Note: The left panel presents the ratio of procurement price to market price for compos-
ite agricultural products between 1962 and 1992, and the right panel shows the trend of
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year
rice wheat
procurement price to maket price ratio: Sicular(1995) and NBS 1960−1992
Figure C.2: Procurement quantity and price for some products
Note: This left panel presents the quantity of the procurement obligation on grain and
cotton between 1950 and 1992, and the right panel presents the ratio of procurement
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year
ln_MUE ln_MUE_v2
log of number of urban enterpirses: NBS 1950−1992
Figure C.3: Ratio of grain and number of urban enterprises
Note: The left panel presents the share of grain crop to the total amount of grain and cash
crop representing the total amount of agricultural production. The Right panel presents
the number of urban enterprises. The dot line includes data only from SOEs, and the
solid line includes four components: SOE, private, mixed, and others, including foreign
enterprises. As only SOE data is available for the period before 1984, the jump in the
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year
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year
LRE_ratio LRE_ratio_v2
Labor force in TVEs to total rural labor force: NBS 1975−1992
Figure C.4: Number and employment share of TVEs
Note: This figure presents the number of TVEs (left) and the employment share of TVEs
(right). The dot line only has township enterprises, and the solid line (v2) has township,
villages, private, and mixed enterprises. In 1984, there was a large increase in the number
of private TVEs; therefore, the jump in 1984 was mainly the result of adding private TVEs
to the data.
53
Table C.1: Intermediate goods share














Source: China Industrial Productivity (CIP) and author’s calculation. The column “Yn in
Ya” is the share of nonagricultural goods as intermediate goods to the total agricultural
output. The column “Ya in Yn” is the share of agricultural goods as intermediate goods
to the total output of non-agricultural goods. The row “average” is the average share
weighted by output across years.
Table C.2: Agricultural goods share as intermediate inputs
YEAR AGR CLM PTM MEM NMM FB TBC TEX WEA LEA WF PP PET CHE RP BUI MET MEP
1981 0.53 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.84 0.65 0.22 0.09 0.27 0.07 0.30 0.01 0.09 0.22 0.05 0.00 0.01
1982 0.56 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.80 0.60 0.25 0.10 0.30 0.18 0.29 0.01 0.11 0.20 0.04 0.00 0.01
1983 0.55 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.77 0.56 0.27 0.12 0.30 0.22 0.25 0.01 0.11 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.01
1984 0.55 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.75 0.52 0.27 0.12 0.30 0.23 0.22 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.03 0.00 0.01
1985 0.51 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.68 0.45 0.24 0.10 0.24 0.22 0.17 0.00 0.09 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.00
1986 0.49 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.65 0.42 0.23 0.10 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.00
1987 0.48 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.62 0.39 0.22 0.10 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.00
1988 0.44 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.62 0.37 0.20 0.08 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.00
1989 0.43 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.62 0.37 0.18 0.08 0.14 0.21 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.00
1990 0.47 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.67 0.40 0.23 0.10 0.16 0.23 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.00
1991 0.43 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.64 0.37 0.20 0.08 0.13 0.21 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.00
1992 0.40 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.62 0.35 0.18 0.08 0.10 0.18 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00
YEAR MCH ELE ICT INS TRS OTH UTL CON SAL HOT TS PT FIN REA BUS ADM EDU HEA
1981 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.02
1982 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.02
1983 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.02
1984 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.02
1985 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02
1986 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02
1987 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02
1988 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01
1989 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01
1990 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02
1991 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02
1992 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01
Source: China Industrial Productivity (CIP). Each column represents an industry, the
value is the ratio of the share of agricultural goods to the total intermediate goods in this
industry.
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Table C.3: Intermediate goods to output ratio
Industry 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
ADM 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.35 0.43 0.52
AGR 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.37
BUI 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.65 0.65
BUS 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.51
CHE 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71
CLM 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.48 0.54 0.55 0.56
CON 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.70
EDU 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.40 0.34 0.28
ELE 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.75
F&B 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.80
FIN 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.07 0.27 0.48
HEA 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.57
HOT 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.70 0.65 0.60
ICT 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75
INS 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.60 0.62 0.66 0.66 0.66
LEA 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.80
MCH 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.72
MEM 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.57 0.59 0.61
MEP 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.76
MET 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.74 0.73 0.72
NMM 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.56 0.61
OTH 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.74 0.75 0.75
P&P 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.73
P&T 0.46 0.46 0.40 0.35 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.31
PET 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.63 0.65 0.69 0.72
PTM 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.35 0.36 0.38
R&P 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.75
REA 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.41 0.39 0.36 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.28 0.25
SAL 0.55 0.55 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.46 0.55 0.54 0.53
SER 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.51
T&S 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.44
TBC 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.39 0.44
TEX 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.79
TRS 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.73
UTL 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.73
W&F 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.73 0.75
WEA 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.78
Source: China Industrial Productivity (CIP). Each row represents an industry, and the
value is the ratio of intermediate goods to output in this industry.
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Table C.4: Industry code description
Description Industry
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry & fishery AGR
Coal mining CLM
Oil & gas excavation PTM
Metal mining MEM
Non-metallic minerals mining NMM
Food and kindred products F&B
Tobacco products TBC
Textile mill products TEX
Apparel and other textile products WEA
Leather and leather products LEA
Sawmill products, furniture, fixtures W&F
Paper products, printing & publishing P&P
Petroleum and coal products PET
Chemicals and allied products CHE
Rubber and plastics products R&P
Stone, clay, and glass products BUI
Primary & fabricated metal industries MET
Metal products (excluding rolling products) MEP
Industrial machinery and equipment MCH
Electric equipment ELE
Electronic and telecommunication equipment ICT
Instruments and office equipment INS
Motor vehicles & other transportation equipment TRS
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries OTH
Power, steam, gas, and tap water supply UTL
Construction CON
Wholesale and retail trades SAL
Hotels and restaurants HOT
Transport, storage & post services T&S
Information & computer services P&T
Financial Intermediations FIN
Real estate services REA
Leasing, technical, science & business services BUS
Government, public administration, and political and social organizations, etc. ADM
Education EDU
Healthcare and social security services HEA
Cultural, sports, and entertainment services; residential and other services SER
Source: China Industrial Productivity (CIP).
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